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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the Utah Court of Appeals' Decision requiring each 
party to bear their own attorney's fees for trial litigation 
consistent with prior decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
the Utah Supreme Court? 
2. Is the Utah Court of Appeals' Decision requiring each 
party to bear their own attorney's fees on appeal consistent with 
the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision to be reviewed was filed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals on February 10, 1989. On February 24, 1989, Respondent 
filed a Petition for Rehearing seeking an award of her attorney's 
fees on appeal. That petition was originally granted without 
providing Dr. Sorensen an opportunity to respond. It was then set 
aside on motion of Dr. Sorensen, and the petition was finally 
denied on March 23, 1989. Dr. Sorensen timely filed a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah on April 17, 1989. 
The Cross-Petitioner, Mrs. Sorensen, was granted an extension of 
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time, to and including June 16, 1989, in which to file a brief in 
opposition Dr. Sorensen's Petition for Writ of Certiorari and 
Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Mrs. Sorensen filed her 
Brief in opposition and Cross-Petition Brief on June 16, 1989. The 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section, 78-3-2(a), Section 78-2-a-4 (1987) and Rule 42 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
RULES DETERMINATIVE OF REVIEW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
issues presented to this Court 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case tried before the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce were signed and entered on February 24, 1987. The husband 
timely appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. After full briefing 
and oral argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. The wife then filed a Petition for Rehearing on 
the issue of attorney's fees incurred on appeal. That Petition was 
granted without providing the husband an opportunity to respond. 
It was then set aside on motion of the husband, reconsidered and 
ultimately denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on March 23, 1989. 
The husband then timely filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
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with ' ' * • • . * *rief in Opposition to the 
Petition for Writ J: Certiorari and a Cross-Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Statement of Facts sets forth the facts relevant to the 
trial court's award of attorney "> the Utah Court of Appeals' 
reversal of; that award and its denial of Mrs* Sorensen's request 
for an award of attorney's fees on appeal. 
The trial court entered a Decree of Divoice which, among other 
things, required Dr. Sorensen to pay not only his own attorney's 
fees, but also $2,000 towards his wife's fees 9 6 ) . Dr. 
Sorensen appea 1 eel f I n» l r i a i i on i r 1 f s award of attorney' s fees, as 
well as other portions of the Decree of Divorce s the Utah Court 
of Appeals. in her Brief related to that *• • ^ A . Sorensen 
requested the Cn>ir+ « ! ' ppeals to affirm the trial court's award 
of attorney's fees and to r^ard her attorney's fees she expected 
to incur upon appeal. Brief of Respondent, at 24. 
The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in 
its $2,000 award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen on the grounds 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the award and, 
consequently , reversed that part of the ti MI a 1 court's decision. 
The Court of Appeals did not address Mrs. Sorensen 1s request for 
her attorney's fees oi I appeal, 1 Irs, Sorensen then filed a Petition 
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for Rehearing, requesting the Court of Appeals to award her 
attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Without providing Dr. Sorensen 
an opportunity to respond, the Petition was granted. Dr. Sorensen 
then filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order Granting Petition for 
Rehearing and Order of Remand. That Motion was granted, Dr. 
Sorensen filed a response in opposition to the request and the 
Petition for Rehearing was the ultimately denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOLLOWED UTAH 
LAW IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MRS. SORENSEN. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen was error where that award was 
made without any evidence presented as "to the reasonableness of 
the number of hours, the usual hourly rate for divorce cases in the 
community, nor the overall reasonableness of the fees" all of which 
is required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the award, 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah App. 1989). 
This ruling is entirely in conformity with Utah law and prior 
decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the decisions of this 
Court. Utah's appellate courts consistently require that evidence 
must be presented on at least three factors to demonstrate that 
such award is reasonable prior to any award of attorney's fees 
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being made i" iivoi:eiie .actions. Those are: 
1. The necessity of the number of hours dedicated; 
2. The reasonableness of the rare charged In light of 
the d ifficulty oil the case and the result accomplished; 
and 
3. The rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the 
community. 
[See Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980), Tallev v. 
Tallev, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. I9H7)„] 
No evidence was presented to the trial court by Mrs. Sorensen 
on any of these factors. 
Additionally Minre is dj.sn no finding of fact or reference 
in the trial court • written ruling related to the evidence of 
reasonableness needed to support an .VJPPI rl aft orney "«.. tees to 
Mrs. Sorensen. 
Mrs. Sorensen argues in her Cross-Petition to this court, that 
the trial attorneys st ,i pu 1 at-eil lo t hi reasonableness of Mrs. 
Sorensen1 s attorney's fees. This is simply not true. All that Dr. 
Sorensen's trial attorney agreed to was that Mrs. Sorensen had 
incurred a certain amount in attorney's fees. The stipulation 
specifically excluded the reasonableness of those attorney's fees, 
as is apparent from the trial transcript: 
THE COURT: Would you stipulate, Mr. Echard, 
that if Dr. Healy were to testify, that he 
would testify that his fee in this matter is 
5 
$3,587.50, in additional with witness and 
subpoenas fees. The stipulation would not go 
to the question of whether or not they are 
reasonable or whether they should be awarded, 
but that would be his testimony. May it be so 
stipulated? (Emphasis added). 
MR. ECHARD: It may, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The court would receive the 
stipulation for that purpose. (Emphasis 
added.) 
(Vol. I. p. 214) 
Succinctly put, the stipulation did not go to the issue of 
reasonableness and there was no evidence of the reasonableness of 
the fee before the trial court. 
Mrs. Sorensen asserts that her case is similar to Mauqhan v. 
Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). However, the facts in 
Mauqhan are very different from those in Sorensen. In Mauqhan, the 
trial attorneys stipulated to the reasonableness of the rate 
charged by plaintiff's counsel. Id at 162. In Sorensen. neither 
the reasonableness of the rate charged, nor the necessity of the 
hours spent, nor the rate commonly charged in the community were 
agreed upon nor was there any evidence offered as to those issues. 
All three factors of the "reasonableness" test for an award of 
attorney's fees being absent, the Utah Court of Appeals 
appropriately reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees 
as being not supported by the evidence. 
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In Tallev v. Talley, 739 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1987) on facts 
substantially identical to those in the Sorensen case, the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had not presented evidence 
on the three factors supporting the reasonableness of the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees and, therefore, denied any award. 
There, the appellate court observed that: 
Although plaintiff sufficiently 
demonstrated reasonable financial need, she 
failed to present evidence of the 
reasonableness of the fee requested. At the 
close of plaintiff's case, her counsel 
proffered testimony and produced an exhibit 
itemizing the time and costs expended by him, 
his associate, and his clerk, and the hourly 
rates charged for each. Conspicuously absent 
is any evidence "regarding the necessity of the 
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty 
of the case and the result accomplished, and 
the rates commonly charged for divorce action 
in the community. . . . " Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980). 
Talley at 84. 
Consistent with the rule in Talley, and the decisions of this 
Court, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court's 
award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
EACH PARTY BEAR THEIR OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS ON APPEAL. 
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It was within the discretion of the 
Court of Appeals not to award Mrs. 
Sorensen any fees on appeal. 
In the appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals, Mrs. 
Sorensen's only request for attorney's fees on appeal is found in 
the four line Conclusion of her Brief which in relevant part 
states: 
. . . (iii) to award her attorney's fees for 
defending this appeal. 
Respondent's Brief (Court of Appeals) P. 24. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion on this request was initially 
silent, however, when Mrs. Sorensen's Petition for Rehearing was 
ultimately denied, that denial represented by implication a 
decision the opinion meant that, each side was to be responsible 
for their own fees on appeal. 
Such a result is entirely within the wide discretion afforded 
appellate courts when deciding whether or not to award attorney's 
fees on appeal 
As the Utah Court of Appeals stated in Maucrhan v. Maucrhan, 770 
P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989): 
Attorney' s fees on appeal may be granted in the 
discretion of the court in conformance with 
statute or rule. (Footnote citation omitted). 
Id. at 162. 
Although the court in Mauahan awarded the respondent 
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attorney's fees on appeal, it took special care to indicate that 
the award was purely discretionary: 
In view of our affirmances and the record 
evidence of her financial need, we exercise our 
discretion and award Paulette attorney fees on 
appeal. (Emphasis added). 
Id. 
There, unlike the Sorensen case, the appellate court affirmed 
the trial court's awards to the respondent in toto. In the present 
case, the Court of Appeals acted consistently with Maughan when it 
exercised its discretion and required each party to be responsible 
for their own appeal expenses. Accordingly, this part of the Court 
of Appeals' decision should be upheld. 
Mrs. Sorensen's request for 
attorney's fees on appeal is 
inappropriate because the Court of 
Appeals reversed in part the trial 
court's decision. 
Mrs. Sorensen is not entitled to her attorney's fees on appeal 
because Dr. Sorensen was successful in securing at least a partial 
reversal of the trial court's decision. Fees on appeal should be 
awarded only where it is shown that an appeal is frivolous and 
without merit. In this case, the appeal was with merit resulting 
in a partial reversal. 
In Workman v. Workman. 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982), a husband 
appealed a trial court's property distribution. The Supreme Court 
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affirmed certain portions of the Decree but modified one aspect of 
it regarding sale of the marital residence. In responding to the 
appeal, the wife contended that she was entitled to attorney's fees 
on appeal. Justice Oakes, writing for a unanimous Court, held that 
since the appeal resulted in a modification of the Decree in favor 
of the husband Appellant, an award of attorney's fees to the wife 
on appeal was inappropriate. 
The same thing occurred in this case, therefore, any award of 
attorney's fees on appeal to Mrs. Sorensen would be inappropriate. 
Mrs. Sorensen's request for 
attorney's fees on appeal was 
untimely. 
Mrs. Sorensen's request for fees on appeal comes too late. 
That is an issue to be raised and argued in the principal briefs 
on appeal not on a Petition for Rehearing or in a Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. Mrs. Sorensen's only reference to attorney's fees 
on appeal is found in her four-line conclusion on page 2 4 of her 
Court of Appeals Brief which states: 
Mrs. Sorensen asks this Court (i) to affirm the 
decision of the district court; (ii) to award 
her the costs she has incurred on appeal; and 
(iii) to award her attorney's fees for 
defending this appeal. (Emphasis added.) 
This issue was never properly briefed. Consequently, it is 
untimely and incorrect to now seek an award of attorney's fees on 
10 
appeal. 
Mrs. Sorensen did not demonstrate the 
requisite need to be awarded any fees 
on appeal. 
Any award of attorney's fees in a divorce action, whether at 
trial or appeal, must be based upon the need of the party making 
the request unless the appeal is totally without merit or 
frivolous. [See Kerr, supra, and Talley, supra, Maughan, supra. 
In this case, Mrs. Sorensen was awarded alimony, child support and 
approximately $131,000 in assets as acknowledged by the Court of 
Appeals on page 14 of its opinion. Therefore, the requisite 
element of need was not present to justify an award of attorney's 
fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Controlling Utah law requires that in divorce actions a moving 
party present evidence on three factors demonstrating that the 
requested award of attorney's fees is reasonable: (1) the 
necessity of the number of hours dedicated; (2) the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the case and the result; and (3) 
the rates commonly charged for divorce action in the community. 
Mrs. Sorensen failed to present evidence on any of these factors. 
Consistent with Utah law, the Court of Appeals properly reversed 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees made to Mrs. Sorensen. 
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Based on the Court of Appeals1 partial reversal on the 
attorney's fees issue, Mrs. Sorensen1s failure to timely raise the 
issue, and the absence of Mrs. Sorensenfs need given the overall 
property distribution, Mrs. Sorensen is not entitled to be awarded 
her attorney's fees on appeal 
Accordingly, Mrs. Sorensen's Cross-Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied in all respects and Dr. Sorensen should 
be awarded his costs incurred. 
Dated: July (7, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
fent M. Kastmg 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent 
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